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  <titleInfo>
    <title>One political economy, one competitive strategy?</title>
    <subTitle>comparing pharmaceutical firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK</subTitle>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Herrmann, Andrea M.</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <genre authority="marc">bibliography</genre>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
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    </place>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">Oxford</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">New York</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2008</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
  </language>
  <physicalDescription>
    <form authority="marcform">print</form>
    <extent>xvi, 202 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>"One Political Economy, One Competitive Strategy? begins with an assessment of how many pharmaceutical firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK pursue strategies facilitated by national institutions governing the financial markets, antitrust activities, and the labour market. Quantitative analyses reveal that deviant firms, competing through institutionally unsupported strategies, outnumber conforming firms by far. Not only does this finding run counter to the expectations of the competitiveness literature, it brings up a whole new line of inquiry. How can firms compete through strategies that are not supported by national institutions? The book addresses this question and illustrates that firms do not necessarily exploit comparative institutional advantages, but that they can also circumvent institutional constraints. International markets and individual collaboration on a contractual basis allow firms to compete despite comparative institutional disadvantages. These findings suggest that trade liberalization does not lead to strategy specialization but to strategy diversification, depending on the inventiveness of entrepreneurs to develop individual approaches to compete."--BOOK JACKET.</abstract>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Andrea M. Herrmann.</note>
  <note>Includes bibliographical references (p. [171]-185) and index.</note>
  <subject>
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    <geographicCode authority="marcgac">e-uk---</geographicCode>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Pharmaceutical industry</topic>
    <geographic>Germany</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Pharmaceutical industry</topic>
    <geographic>Italy</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Pharmaceutical industry</topic>
    <geographic>Great Britain</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Drug Industry</topic>
    <topic>economics</topic>
    <geographic>Germany</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Drug Industry</topic>
    <topic>economics</topic>
    <geographic>Italy</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Drug Industry</topic>
    <topic>economics</topic>
    <geographic>United States</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Economic Competition</topic>
    <geographic>Germany</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Economic Competition</topic>
    <geographic>Italy</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Economic Competition</topic>
    <geographic>United States</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Technology, Pharmaceutical</topic>
    <topic>economics</topic>
    <geographic>Germany</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Technology, Pharmaceutical</topic>
    <topic>economics</topic>
    <geographic>Italy</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="mesh">
    <topic>Technology, Pharmaceutical</topic>
    <topic>economics</topic>
    <geographic>United States</geographic>
  </subject>
  <classification authority="lcc">HD9671.A2 H47 2008</classification>
  <classification authority="ddc" edition="22">338.476151094</classification>
  <classification authority="nlm">2009 B-139</classification>
  <classification authority="nlm">QV 736 H568o 2008</classification>
  <identifier type="isbn">9780199543434 (hbk. : alk. paper)</identifier>
  <identifier type="lccn">2011291254</identifier>
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    <recordCreationDate encoding="marc">110907</recordCreationDate>
    <recordChangeDate encoding="iso8601">20141027110820.0</recordChangeDate>
    <recordIdentifier source="MWNLS">16950895</recordIdentifier>
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